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The presence of strategic customers may force an already nancially distressed rm into a death spiral:
Sensing the rm's nancial diculty, customers may wait strategically for deep discounts in liquidation
sales. In turn, such waiting lowers the rm's protability and increases the rm's bankruptcy risk. Using
a two-period model to capture these dynamics, this paper identies customers' strategic waiting behavior
as a source of a rm's cost of nancial distress. We also nd that customers' anticipation of bankruptcy
can be self-fullling: When customers anticipate a high bankruptcy probability, they prefer to delay their
purchases, making the rm more likely to go bankrupt than when customers anticipate a low probability of
bankruptcy. Such behavior has important operational and nancial implications. First, the rm acts more
conservatively when either facing more severe nancial distress or a large share of strategic customers. As
its nancial situation deteriorates, the rm lowers inventory alone when nancial distress is mild or only a
small share of customers are strategic and lowers both inventory and price in the presence of severe nancial
distress and a large fraction of strategic customers. Under optimal price and inventory decisions, strategic
waiting accounts for a large part of the rm's total cost of nancial distress, although a larger proportion
of strategic customers may result in a lower probability of bankruptcy. In addition to inventory reduction
and (immediate) price discount, we nd that a deferred discount, in the form of rebates and/or store credits
for future purchases, can act as an eective mechanism to mitigate strategic waiting. As a contingent price
reduction, deferred discounts align the interests of customers and the rm and are most eective when the
fraction of strategic customers is high and the rm's nancial distress is at a medium level.
Key words : nancial distress; liquidation sale; strategic customers; inventory; pricing; deferred discount;
rebate; store credit
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1. Introduction
Squeezed by disappointing demand and nancial pressure, many major US retailers, including
Linens 'n Things in May 2008, Circuit City in November 2009, Borders in February 2011, and, most
recently, Sports Authority in March 2016, have led for bankruptcy. Many others, such as Sears
and Radio Shack, while operating as going concerns, have closed a large share of their existing
stores (Isidore 2014, Wahba 2016a). These are not isolated cases. In fact, according to Gaur et al.
(2014), 15% of US public retailers entered bankruptcy in the past 20 years.
Another challenge retailers face is increasingly sophisticated customers. Due to a conuence
of technology, economy, and social norms, it has become increasingly common across all income
brackets and a wide variety of goods for customers to wait an extraordinary amount of time to
purchase a good at the lowest possible price (Silverstein and Butman 2006, Paragon 2011). Recent
academic research has found strong empirical support for such strategic waiting behavior. For
example, Li et al. (2014) quantify that between 5.2% and 19.2% of customers purposely delay air
ticket purchases in anticipation of possible future price discounts. Similar strategic behaviors are
empirically documented for console video games (Nair 2007), textbooks (Chevalier and Goolsbee
2009), and soft drinks (Hendel and Nevo 2013). In a controlled laboratory environment, Osadchiy
and Bendoly (2013) nd that, facing a future purchase opportunity, up to 79% of customers exhibit
forward-looking behavior. Such strategic waiting behavior can have a signicant detrimental impact
on rms' protability (Su and Zhang 2008, Cachon and Swinney 2009).
Retailers' nancial diculties can be another reason for customers to postpone their purchases
strategically as bankruptcy and large-scale store closures are often followed by liquidation sales.
For example, in May 2016, after a failed reorganization, Sports Authority immediately started
liquidating all 463 stores (Wahba 2016b). In 2014, Radio Shack liquidated the inventory of the 1,100
stores it closed. The amount of inventories liquidated during these sales is tremendous. According
to Craig and Raman (2015), the value of inventory sold during the liquidations of Linens 'n Things,
Circuit City, and Borders alone was more than $3 billion. To add to the pressure faced by retailers,
liquidation sales, as regulated by state laws, are limited to short times periods such as 60 or 90
days (Ohio Administrative Code Chapter 109:4-3-17, Massachusetts General Laws Part 1, Chapter
93). To liquidate a large amount of inventory within such a short space of time, retailers inevitably
oer deep price discounts; this may entice consumers to postpone purchases when they observe a
retailer's weakening nancial situation.
In addition to the above empirical evidence on customers' strategic waiting behavior, recent
research also nds that customers can reasonably assess a rm's level of nancial distress, in par-
ticular, the probability of bankruptcy, and thus incorporate such information into their purchasing
behavior. For example, Hortacsu et al. (2013) nd that shifting an automaker's probability of
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default from zero to near-certain bankruptcy reduces the average market value of that producer's
used cars by $1,400 on a $28,000 car. Such evidence is consistent with previous research on the
wisdom of the crowd that, collectively, average people can make accurate forecasts of complicated
events, often more so than individual experts (Ho and Chen 2007, Surowiecki 2005).
Anecdotal evidence also supports the possibility that customers may react in anticipation of a
rm's nancial distress and the subsequent liquidation sale. For example, many websites enable
customers to have access to information on a company's nancial diculties, the progress of liqui-
dation, and how to cash in on liquidation sales (Bowsher 2011). Discussions around (the possibility
of) liquidation sales are also hot topics on online forums. Interest in possible goods deals around
bankruptcy is also reected in online search volume. As shown in Figure 1, the (relative) search
volume for \Borders coupon" rose gradually prior to Borders' bankruptcy ling. Similar patterns
are also present around other retailers' bankruptcy. While this phenomenon may be attributed to
other factors, one possibility is that customers searched for bargains more actively as they became
increasingly aware of the rm's nancial diculty.
Figure 1 Ratio of (normalized) weekly Google search volumes for \Borders coupon" to those for "Borders"
around the bankruptcy of Borders (GoogleTrend 2015)
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Borders filed for bankruptcy on Feb 16, 2011
Motivated by the above phenomena, this paper focuses on examining the operational and nan-
cial implications of strategic customer behavior as a source of nancial distress.1 Specically, the
1 In addition to interactions between retailers and individual consumers, the dynamics described above are also present
in business-to-business settings where business buyers may strategically time their purchases in response to a seller's
nancial distress. The goods purchased may also be nancial assets or investment projects. For example, prior to its
bankruptcy in April 2016, SunEdison, the solar developer, was in the process of selling part of its asset portfolio,
which is now likely to be sold in liquidation (Weso 2016). To reect this, in the remainder of the paper, we refer to
the seller as the rm and the buyers as customers.
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paper investigates the following three questions. First, how do customers react to a rm's nan-
cial distress, and how does this reaction inuence the rm's probability of bankruptcy in return?
Second, under such behavior, how do consumer characteristics and nancial conditions jointly
inuence the rm's operational decisions, such as inventory and price, as well as its protability?
Third, apart from inventory and price, is there another mechanism that may alleviate the adverse
impact of strategic consumer behavior on nancially distressed rms?
To answer these questions, we incorporate two salient features into the classic newsvendor model.
First, we use the rm's level of nancial distress () to capture the amount of prot the rm needs to
make in order to avoid bankruptcy. Higher  generally leads to a higher probability of bankruptcy.
Second, we capture consumer characteristics using the fraction of strategic customers (), i.e., the
share of customers in the market that may time their purchases strategically in anticipation of a
liquidation sale.
Using this model, we nd that collectively, customers' strategic waiting behavior can have a
signicant impact on a rm's probability of bankruptcy. More importantly, customers' anticipation
of bankruptcy can be self-fullling: When strategic customers believe that a rm's probability of
bankruptcy is high, they react by waiting in the rst period due to the high likelihood of obtaining
a bargain in the following period's liquidation sale. Such waiting in turn leads to a higher actual
probability of bankruptcy than when customers anticipate a low probability of bankruptcy. Such
dynamics may serve as a channel that contributes to the death spiral faced by distressed retailers,
as alluded to by industry experts (Sozzi 2016).
The possibility of liquidation sales and strategic waiting leads to several important implica-
tions for a rm's operational decisions and performance. First, the threat of nancial distress is
aggravated as the proportion of strategic customers increases. Second, when inducing customers
to purchase, the rm rst lowers its inventory and then oers a price discount. As the level of
nancial distress () increases, the rm lowers its inventory regardless of , which is consistent
with the empirical ndings that distressed retailers lower their inventory levels (Chevalier 1995,
Matsa 2011). However, the price discount only increases in  when  is low or  is high. Third,
over a wide range of levels of nancial distress, the rm's probability of bankruptcy decreases in
the proportion of strategic customers.
In addition, we argue that deferred discounts, such as (non-cash) rebates or store credit for future
purchases, can be more eective than immediate price discounts in mitigating strategic waiting.
This is because, unlike immediate discounts, whose value is independent of strategic customers'
behavior, deferred discounts are more valuable when the rm's probability of bankruptcy is lower.
This contingency better aligns the interests of the rm and customers, nudging strategic customers
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to purchase early. We also nd that deferred discounts are most valuable when a rm faces medium
nancial distress and many strategic customers.
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, as an initial attempt to link strategic customer
behavior to nancial distress, the paper examines how strategic customers react to a rm's nancial
distress and point out that customers' strategic waiting for liquidation sales may serve as an impor-
tant source of nancial distress. Second, by characterizing how rms respond to nancial distress
and the corresponding customer behavior by adjusting inventory levels and oering (immediate)
price discounts and/or deferred discounts, our paper may oer possible explanations for anecdotal
evidence and motivate future empirical research.
2. Related Literature
Focusing on the operations of a nancially distressed rm in the presence of strategic customers,
our paper is closely related to two streams of literature: the operations{nance interface and
consumer-driven operations management.
The operations{nance interface literature stresses that a rm's nancial situation can have a
signicant impact on its operational decisions, which in turn inuences the rm's nancial health.
In this stream of literature, Xu and Birge (2004), Babich and Sobel (2004), Dada and Hu (2008),
Boyabatl and Toktay (2011), Alan and Gaur (2011), Dong and Tomlin (2012), Li et al. (2013),
Chod and Zhou (2013), and Luo and Shang (2013) study how a rm links its operational decisions,
such as inventory and capacity investment, to its nancing decisions in the presence of nancial
market imperfections. Yang and Birge (2009), Kouvelis and Zhao (2011), and Kouvelis and Zhao
(2012) examine how to structure dierent types of supply chain contracts when one party in the
supply chain is nancially constrained. Papers in this stream mostly use the cost of nancial
distress in its reduced form as the main source of market imperfection. Our paper complements this
literature by focusing on strategic customer behavior as a source of nancial distress and examining
the corresponding implications for a rm's operational decisions and performance. In a related
segment of literature, Babich et al. (2007), Swinney and Netessine (2009), Babich (2010), and
Yang et al. (2015) study the externality of one rm's nancial distress on other rms in the supply
chain. Similarly, we also endogenize the impact of bankruptcy by including customers as an integral
part of the supply chain. Finally, Craig and Raman (2015) characterize the detailed operational
decisions, such as transshipment, store closures, and dynamic pricing, during a retailer's liquidation
sale. Using real-world data, they show that the eciency of liquidation sales can be signicantly
improved when various operational levers are optimized jointly. Our paper complements theirs by
emphasizing the possibility that liquidation sales have a signicant impact on rms' pre-bankruptcy
operational decisions and performance when customers anticipate a rm's risk of bankruptcy and
the subsequent liquidation sale.
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By focusing on strategic customer behavior as an additional source of nancial distress, our
paper is also related to the expanding literature on consumer-driven operations management and,
in particular, to studies that focus on the implications of customers' forward-looking behavior. See
Netessine and Tang (2009) for an overview of related works. Research in this literature focuses
on identifying the adverse eects of strategic consumer behavior and proposing various forms of
operational mitigation, such as quantity commitment (Su and Zhang 2008, Liu and van Ryzin
2008), price commitment (Aviv and Pazgal 2008, Lai et al. 2010), display format (Yin et al. 2009),
quick response (Cachon and Swinney 2009), early-purchase reward (Aviv and Wei 2015), and
group buying (Surasvadi et al. 2015). Our paper also highlights the adverse impact of strategic
consumer behavior but with a focus on how such behavior interacts with a rm's nancial distress.
In addition, we argue that deferred discounts, such as (mail-in) rebates and store credit, serve as
an eective mechanism to mitigate strategic waiting.2 Furthermore, several recent papers examine
the impact of strategic consumer behavior on other common operational decisions such as demand
learning (Aviv et al. 2015), product quality (Yu et al. 2014, Papanastasiou and Savva 2015), and
new product launches (Lobel et al. 2016). Similarly, our paper studies the impact of strategic
consumer behavior on operational decisions under nancial distress.
To the best of our knowledge, Hortacsu et al. (2011) is the only extant paper to model the
interaction between bankruptcy and customers' behavior in anticipation of bankruptcy. Our paper
diers from theirs in two ways. First, in their paper the channel that lowers customers' rst-period
valuation is because of a lack of after-sales service; we focus on the possibility of deeper discounts
in the future, which is closely related to a rm's operational decisions, such as price and inventory.
Second, Hortacsu et al. (2011) call for public policy, such as a government guarantee, to reduce
the impact of bankruptcy anticipation on consumers' product valuations, while our paper focuses
on reducing the bankruptcy feedback eect through operational levers that the rm can control.
Finally, by examining deferred discounts, our paper is also related to the literature on rebates,
which can be seen as a specic form of deferred discount. As a widely used marketing tool, rebates
have been studied in both the marketing (Soman 1998, Lu and Moorthy 2007) and operations
management literatures (Chen et al. 2007, Cho et al. 2009, Arya and Mittendorf 2013). We com-
plement the above papers by showing that, as deferred discounts, rebates better align customers'
interests with those of the rm when the latter is in nancial distress.
2 For nancially distressed rms, some mechanisms discussed in the literature may be less eective. For example, it is
dicult for rms in bankruptcy to honor their price-matching commitments; some may face legal requirements when
invalidating prior commitments to protect creditors ex-post. However, as shown later, this lack of commitment power
is the exact mechanism that makes deferred discounts eective.
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3. The Basic Model
We model a rm selling a single type of product to customers over two periods. The sequence of
events is illustrated in Figure 2. In the rst period (the regular sale), the rm sets both the \full" (or
\regular") price p and the inventory level q, which is procured at unit cost c.3 The total number of
customers who may purchase in the rst period is a random variable D 2 [dl; dh) with a cumulative
distribution function (CDF) F (), probability density function (PDF) f(), complementary CDF
F () = 1 F (), and failure rate h() = f()= F (x). The demand distribution is assumed to have an
increasing failure rate (IFR), a mild condition that is satised by most commonly used distributions.
Unsatised rst-period demand is lost. Let R1(D;p; q) be the realized rst-period revenue under
the rst-period demand D and decisions (p; q). The specic form of R1() depends on customers'
purchase decisions and is detailed later.
In the second period, depending on the rm's nancial status, as described later, the rm sets its
second-period price p2 to clear its leftover inventory.
4 Let R2(D;p; q) be the realized second-period
revenue under the optimal p2. Following the literature (Jensen 2001, Ayotte and Morrison 2009,
Becker and Stromberg 2012), we assume that the rm's objective is to maximize its expected prot
over the two periods, i.e. (p; q) =  cq + E[R1(D;p; q) +R2(D;p; q)], which is also equivalent to
maximizing the rm's value.5
Figure 2 Sequence of events
Salvage saleRegular sale
The firm sets
p and q.
Myopic and strategic cus-
tomers arrive. Strategic cus-
tomers decide whether to pur-
chase now or wait.
Bargain hunters
and any waiting
strategic cus-
tomers purchase.
Is the firm's first-
period profit less
than τ?
No
Yes, the
firm goes
bankrupt.
The firm
sets p2.
Liquidation sale
3 In Section 6, we extend the basic model by allowing the rm to oer a deferred discount in addition to setting price
and inventory.
4As we show later, if the rm is not bankrupt, the inventory-clearing price p2 also maximizes the rm's second-period
revenue. In bankruptcy, the rm cannot credibly commit not to clear the entire inventory. Therefore, the inventory-
clearing price is more appropriate. In addition, as suggested by Lemma C.1, we expect our main qualitative insights
to remain unchanged even if the rm chooses p2 to maximize revenue.
5 The rm's value is composed of both equity and debt value. Thus, even if the rm goes bankruptcy in the second
period, as we will detail in the next section, the revenue from liquidation still belongs to part of the rm's debt value,
and hence is included in the rm's objective function.
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3.1. Level of nancial distress and the possibility of bankruptcy
We capture the rm's level of nancial distress using  2 ( 1;+1).  can be seen as the rm's
net debt, i.e. debt minus liquid assets. The greater  , the more nancially distressed the rm. At
the end of the rst period, the rm is forced into bankruptcy if and only if its rst-period cashow
 cq+R1(D;p; q) is lower than  . To focus on the rm's operational decisions and its interaction
with consumers, we take  as exogenous. This assumption is also supported by the empirical nding
that it is very costly, if not impossible, to reduce debt in the short term (Heider and Ljungqvist
2015). Using the rst-period cashow and  as triggers for bankruptcy, this model is consistent
with two commonly observed phenomena relating to corporate bankruptcy and default. First, in
practice, many companies enter bankruptcy for liquidity diculties (Taub 2008, De La Merced
2012). Second, most debt contracts are associated with covenants on performance measures such
as protability and cash ow. If a rm's performance fails to meet the performance target, the
corresponding covenant is violated and the lender (e.g. the bank) often seizes control of the rm
(Roberts and Su 2009). In both cases, rms enter bankruptcy when their performance fails to
meet an existing threshold.6
The rm's nancial status inuences its second-period operations. If the rm manages to avoid
bankruptcy, it continues normal operations and salvages its remaining inventory over a long period
of time (a salvage sale). On the other hand, if the rm enters bankruptcy, it needs to liquidate
its leftover inventory over a short period of time (a liquidation sale), as is often required by law.
Intuitively, due to the dierence between the salvage and liquidation sales, the second-period price
p2 set by the rm may be lower under a liquidation sale than a salvage sale. As such, the two-period
model naturally captures the make-or-break season and the possible subsequent bankruptcy period
faced by nancially distressed retailers (Mui and Marr 2008, Loeb 2015).
3.2. Customer behavior and its link with bankruptcy
To capture strategic customer behaviors, especially how such behaviors are inuenced by a rm's
nancial status, we assume that the population of consumers is divided into three segments, similar
to Cachon and Swinney (2009). All customers are assumed to be risk-neutral. Customer charac-
teristics are summarized in Table 1.
Two of the three segments of customers arrive in the rst period. Among them, (1  )D are
myopic; they purchase in the rst period as long as their surplus is non-negative, that is, p v. The
rest of the customers (D) are strategic, where  represents the fraction of strategic customers the
rm faces in the market. Observing price p and inventory q, strategic customers decide whether to
6When determining the rm's bankruptcy threshold, taking into consideration the possible salvage value of leftover
inventory should not change our qualitative insights as long as such salvage value is lower when the rm's nancial
distress is more severe, or renancing is costly.
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purchase in the rst period or to wait by comparing the surplus of buying early (v  p) with the
expected surplus of waiting until the second period under a rational belief about other strategic
customers' behavior.7 As all strategic customers are homogenous, we focus on symmetric equilibria.
In addition, we conne our analysis to pure strategy equilibria. Therefore, two possible equilibria
exist: either all strategic customers decide to purchase in the rst period (the buy-equilibrium) or
all wait (the wait-equilibrium).
Table 1 Characteristics of consumer segments
Period-1 Period-2 valuation Period-2 valuation
Segment Number valuation (salvage sale) (liquidation sale)
Myopic (1 )D v n/a n/a
Strategic D v s s
Bargain-hunting +1 n/a s b
The third customer segment is formed of bargain hunters, who only arrive in the second period.
To reect the impact of the rm's nancial status and operational modes (salvage vs. liquidation
sale) on customers, we assume that the bargain hunters' valuation is s under the salvage sale and b
under the liquidation sale, with b < s< c. This assumption captures the reality in two ways. First,
among bargain hunters, some, with a low valuation b, monitor the rm's liquidation status closely
and hence can jump in immediately after the rm announces liquidation. Others, while having a
high valuation s, may only visit the store according to their regular shopping schedule and grab a
deal if they see one. As a result, when the rm is not bankrupt, it can aord to run the salvage
sale for a longer period and wait for the high-valuation bargain hunters to show up. However, a
liquidation sale is time limited, and hence, the rm can only sell to those bargain hunters with a
lower valuation. Second, an individual bargain hunter's valuation may drop during liquidation as
liquidation sales may not oer a satisfactory shopping experience; for example, they face limited
payment options, a more restrictive return policy, and fewer sta to assist customers (Strain 2009).
Finally, similar to Su (2010), we assume that when both strategic and bargain-hunting customers
are present in the second period, the inventory is eciently rationed, that is, the demand from
high-valuation customers is satised rst.
7 In the literature, several papers assume customers can observe q (e.g. Liu and van Ryzin 2008), while others assume
customers cannot observe q and instead form a rational expectation about it (e.g. Cachon and Swinney 2009). Su
and Zhang (2008, 2009) compare both scenarios and quantify the value of a rm's commitment to an inventory level
q in mitigating the adverse eect of strategic waiting. With the understanding that the commitment of q improves
the rm's protability, we assume that the rm can reveal q to customers using various mechanisms, as pointed out
in Liu and van Ryzin (2008) and Su and Zhang (2008, 2009). However, as the analysis in Online Appendix E reveals,
assuming strategic customers cannot observe inventory q does not change our qualitative insights.
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At a high level, the dierence between s and b captures how urgent, or inecient, the liquidation
sale is. As shown later, this dierence causes two sources of indirect cost of nancial distress. First,
as bargain hunters' valuation is lowered in bankruptcy, the rm may have to reduce the second-
period price during liquidation sales, commonly known in the literature as the cost of \re sales"
(Shleifer and Vishny 2011). Second, strategic customers may wait for the potential lower price in
liquidation, hurting the rm's prot in the rst period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We examine strategic customer behavior in x4.
Section 5 analyzes the rm's prot and characterizes its optimal inventory and pricing strategies.
Sections 6 and 7 study how deferred discounts can mitigate strategic waiting and alleviate nancial
distress. Section 8 concludes the paper. The appendix includes a list of notations. All proofs are
included in the online appendices, which also include additional technical results.
4. Strategic Customers' Purchase Decision and Self-fullling
Bankruptcy
We analyze the model through backward induction. Observing price (p) and inventory (q), to decide
whether to purchase at the regular price p or wait for a possible liquidation sale in the event of
bankruptcy, a typical strategic customer weighs the consumer surplus of purchasing (v p) against
the expected surplus of waiting, which depends on the price distribution in the second period.
Lemma 1. The rm's second-period price p2 = b if and only if the rm is in bankruptcy and the
rst-period realized demand is less than q. Otherwise, p2 = s.
Lemma 1 reveals that without bankruptcy, the rm should always set the second-period price at
s. As a result, strategic customers' waiting surplus is zero; hence, these customers do not wait to
purchase if they believe the rm will not go bankrupt. In this sense, our model degenerates to the
classic newsvendor model with salvage value s when the level of nancial distress () is suciently
low.
The rm may still set p2 to s in bankruptcy. This happens when the total inventory q is less
than the realized rst-period demand D or, equivalently, when there are more customers waiting
strategically than leftover inventory, in which case the rm clearly has no incentive to set a price
lower than s. As such, waiting strategic customers are left with zero surplus whether they purchase
or not. This is consistent with the evidence that some customers waiting for deep discounts were
disappointed by the high prices of certain items in Circuit City's liquidation sale (Marco 2009).
Finally, when the rm goes bankrupt and leftover inventory exceeds the number of waiting
strategic customers (q >D), the rm is forced to lower the price to b as it needs to attract bargain
hunters to clear its inventory. This leaves strategic customers with a strictly positive surplus s  b,
and, hence, an incentive to wait if the rst-period price p is suciently high.
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Given the second-period price distribution, it is clear that the maximum waiting surplus for
strategic customers is s  b. Therefore, strategic customers always purchase early when p  v  
(s   b). In addition, early purchase is also guaranteed when p  v and q  dl. To avoid triv-
ial cases, we conne our analysis in this section and the following to the region (p; q) 2 
0 :=
f(p; q)jp2 (v  (s  b); v] and q dlg.
Moving to strategic customers' rst-period purchase decisions, note that the likelihood that
the second-period price will be b depends on the joint probability of q > D and the event of the
rm's bankruptcy. While q >D depends only on the demand distribution and the rm's inventory
decision q, the probability that the rm will go bankrupt is in fact inuenced by strategic customers'
behavior, which is in turn aected by their belief about the probability of bankruptcy. For example,
if strategic customers anticipate a high probability of bankruptcy, and hence a higher chance of
getting a bargain in liquidation, they should nd it more appealing to wait, which, in turn, lowers
the rm's rst-period prot and increases the probability of bankruptcy. Therefore, the rm's
bankruptcy probability and strategic customers' purchase or wait decisions need to be determined
jointly under a rational expectations framework, i.e. individual customers form a rational belief
about other customers' behavior and its impact on the probability of bankruptcy.
Proposition 1. Let Qs(p) := F
 1

v p
s b

and Qb(p) :=max
h
Qs(p);
(1 )pQs(p) 
c
i
.
1. An equilibrium where all strategic customers purchase in the rst period (the buy-equilibrium)
exists if and only if q max

pQs(p) 
c
;Qs(p)

. Under the buy-equilibrium, the rm goes bankrupt
if and only if D<dB :=
cq+
p
.
2. An equilibrium where all strategic customers wait in the rst period (the wait-equilibrium)
exists if and only if q > Qb(p). Under the wait-equilibrium, the rm goes bankrupt if and only if
D<dW :=
cq+
(1 )p .
3. When both equilibria exist, strategic customers' surplus in the wait-equilibrium is greater than
that in the buy-equilibrium, that is, the wait-equilibrium is more appealing to strategic customers.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 3. As shown, the buy-equilibrium exists when the rm's
inventory is lower than a threshold composed of two pieces, capturing the events governing the
second-period price distribution as summarized in Lemma 1. When the rm is in deep distress
(large ), dB > q and the customers' waiting surplus is determined solely by inventory availability
and is independent of the rm's nancial situation. Therefore, customers purchase if and only
if v   p  (s  b)F (q) or, equivalently, q  Qs(p). Similarly, for a smaller  , strategic customers
purchase early if and only if v  p (s  b)F (dB ) or, equivalently, q pQs(p) c .
Symmetrically, the wait-equilibrium exists when q is suciently high. Note that while the exis-
tence region for the buy-equilibrium is independent of the proportion of strategic customers (),
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Figure 3 Strategic customers' behavior in equilibrium under p.
W
B
B;W
Qs
q
τ
q = pQs−τ
c
[(1− α)p− c]Qs (p− c)Qs
q = (1−α)pQs−τ
c
Notes. B (W ) represents that the buy-equilibrium (the wait-equilibrium) exists in the region. The equilibrium that
is more appealing to strategic customers is in bold font and underlined.
the region for the wait-equilibrium expands as  increases, suggesting that strategic customers are
collectively more powerful in their capability to nudge the rm into bankruptcy.
In addition, note that when both  and q are at a medium level, the two equilibria may co-
exist, leading correspondingly to two possibilities for the rm's prot and bankruptcy probability.
In this region, strategic customers' belief about bankruptcy becomes a self-fullling prophecy:
When strategic customers expect that the rm's probability of bankruptcy is high, and hence wait,
the rm indeed enters bankruptcy with a probability F

cq+
(1 )p

that increases with the share of
strategic consumers. Similarly, if strategic customers believe the rm is unlikely to go bankrupt,
and hence purchase early, the probability of bankruptcy decreases to F

cq+
p

. The existence of
multiple equilibria hinges upon two critical features of the model: the distress level  and fraction
of strategic customers . First, note that the region of multiple equilibria expands as  increases.
In other words, a greater proportion of strategic customers amplies the self-fullling prophecy of
bankruptcy. Second, multiple equilibria exist when  is in the medium range. Indeed, if the rm is
suciently distressed, i.e.  > (p  c)Qs, the rm goes bankrupt even if all inventory is sold in the
rst period (dW > d
B
 > q), and hence, customers' waiting surplus becomes independent of their
belief about the probability of bankruptcy.
Interestingly, when both equilibria exist, even though it is intuitive that the rm makes a higher
prot under the buy-equilibrium, the wait-equilibrium is always more appealing to strategic cus-
tomers. The logic is as follows. On the one hand, strategic customers' surplus of purchasing early is
independent of their belief about the rm's bankruptcy probability and, hence, is identical under
both equilibria. On the other hand, their surplus of waiting is higher under the wait-equilibrium
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due to the higher probability of bankruptcy. Consequently, when the wait-equilibrium exists, the
surplus under the equilibrium with waiting is always higher than that of purchasing, which is also
the surplus under the buy-equilibrium.
To distill strategic customers' behavior from these observations, we dene the buy-region as 
B =
f(p; q) 2
0 j q Qb(p)g and the wait-region as 
W = f(p; q) 2
0 j q > Qb(p)g, each corresponding
to the price and inventory pairs that induce strategic customers to buy or wait, respectively, in the
rst period. Note that the buy-region is inuenced by both  and  through Qb(p). In other words,
both the level of nancial distress () and fraction of strategic customers () constrain the rm's
feasible set of prices and inventory positions to those that induce customers to purchase early.
5. Optimal Operational Response to Financial Distress
Built on the understanding of how strategic customers react to a rm's nancial status (), in this
section, we explore how such interactions shape a rm's optimal operational decisions (p and q)
and performance (protability and probability of bankruptcy). We rst lay out the rm's prot
function in the presence of both nancial distress and strategic customers in Section 5.1, followed
by a benchmark without strategic customers ( = 0) in Section 5.2. In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we
examine how the fraction of strategic customers () inuences the rm's decisions and performance
under mild (low ) and severe nancial distress (high ), respectively. Finally, Section 5.5 uses
numerical results to complement the above analytical results and oers a complete picture of how
 and  jointly aect the rm's decisions and performance.
5.1. The rm's prot function
To characterize how the strategic customers' behavior established in Section 4 inuences the rm's
prot function, we rst consider the case where (p; q)2
B. According to Figure 3, for (p  c)q  ,
i.e. dB  q, the rm's prot can be discussed under three scenarios depending on the realized
demand D. First, when D  q, the rm sells everything it has in the rst period, and hence, its
rst-period revenue R1 = pq and its second-period revenue R2 = 0. Second, when D 2 [dB ; q), the
rm sells D at regular price p; thus, R1 = pD. As it avoids bankruptcy, the rm salvages the leftover
inventory at price s, leading to R2 = s(q D). Third, when D<dB , the rm also sells D at regular
price p (R1 = pD). However, as it goes bankrupt, and D< q, according to Lemma 1, the rm must
liquidate the leftover inventory at price b, and hence, R2 = b(q D).
Integrating over D across the three scenarios and rearranging terms, we can see that when
(p; q)2
B and (p  c)q >  , the rm's total expected prot = cq+E[R1+R2] is:
BL (p; q) = (p  c)q  (p  s)
Z q
dl
(q x)dF (x)  (s  b)
Z dB
dl
(q x)dF (x); (1)
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where the subscript B represents that (p; q) 2
B and the superscript L represents that the level
of nancial distress is low, i.e.   (p; c)q. Observe that the rst two terms of (1) are identical to
a traditional newsvendor prot function with price p. The unique feature of nancial distress is
reected in the last term, i.e. (s  b)R dB
dl
(q x)dF (x), which equals to the additional price discount
the rm has to oer in liquidation (s  b) multiplied by the expected leftover inventory conditional
on that the rm is bankrupt D<dB .
On the other hand, if (p c)q <  , i.e. dB > q, the second scenario above (D 2 [dB ; q]) disappears,
and hence, the rm's prot function is:
BH(p; q) = (p  c)q  (p  b)
Z q
dl
(q x)dF (x): (2)
Similarly, the rm's prot under (p; q)2
W follows:8
W (p; q) = (p  c)q  (p  s)
Z q
1 
dl
[q  (1 )x]dF (x)  (s  b)
Z min(q;dW )
dl
[q  (1 )x]dF (x): (3)
As shown, in addition to the term associated with liquidation, when customers are not induced to
purchase early, the rst-period demand faced by the rm is essentially (1 )D.
5.2. The benchmark without strategic customers (= 0)
To isolate how nancial distress alone inuences the rm's operational decisions, we rst establish
a benchmark in the absence of strategic customers (= 0).
Lemma 2. Let qNV := F 1

c s
v s

, and qNVb := F
 1

c b
v b

. In the absence of strategic customers
(= 0), the rm's optimal price is p = v. The optimal inventory q follows:
1. for   vdl  cqNV , q = qNV ;
2. for  2 (vdl  cqNV ; vdl  cqNVb ), q 2 (qNV ; qNVb ) decreases in  ;
3. for  > vdl  cqNVb , q = qNVb .
Under the optimal inventory, the rm's prot decreases in  and its probability of bankruptcy
increases in  .
Two observations are notable. First, without strategic customers, the rm does not oer any price
discount, that is, it charges customers' valuation v in the rst period regardless of nancial distress.
This is intuitive as in our model, price discount is used only to induce strategic customers to
purchase early. Second, we nd that the rm's inventory follows three stages. First, when the rm
is nancially healthy ( is very low, Statement 1 in Lemma 2) and bankruptcy is not a concern, it
simply orders qNV , the newsvendor quantity with salvage price s. At the other extreme, when  is
extremely high (Statement 3), bankruptcy is unavoidable and the rm orders qNVb , the newsvendor
8 See Lemma C.2 in the appendix for detailed derivations.
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quantity with the lower liquidation price b. The dierence between qNV and qNVb captures how the
probability of bankruptcy (and the corresponding liquidation sale) inuences the rm's inventory
level. The lower b relative to s, the lower qNVb is relative to q
NV . Finally, between the above two
scenarios (Statement 2), as  increases, the rm gradually lowers its inventory from qNV to qNVb
to cope with the deteriorating nancial status and the increasing chance of salvaging its leftover
inventory at a lower price. This is consistent with the empirical ndings in Chevalier (1995) and
Matsa (2011) that distressed retailers often lower their inventory levels signicantly.
This benchmark establishes that the presence of nancial distress is the fundamental driver of
the rm's prot reduction. Such reduction is caused by two inter-dependent eects. First, as 
increases, keeping inventory constant, the rm's probability of bankruptcy, and hence the prob-
ability of liquidating its leftover inventory at price b, increases, leading to lower revenue from
liquidation. Second, to (partially) alleviate the rst eect, the rm lowers its inventory q, reducing
the (expected) rst-period prot.
5.3. The rm's operational decisions under mild nancial distress (low )
Apart from the two eects identied in Section 5.2, the presence of strategic customers also inuence
the rm's decision by interacting with  . We examine such interaction with low  in this section
and high  in the next.
Proposition 2. Let TD() := (1 )vdl cqNV . In the presence of strategic customers (> 0),
the rm's optimal price p and inventory q are:
1. for   TD(), p = v and q = qNV .
2. for  > TD(), q < qNV .
(a) 9 TB()>TD() such that for   TB(), (p; q) satisfy q = (1 )pQs(p) 
c
.
(b) 9  > 0 such that for   TD()+ , p = v if f(dl)> 0 and p < v if f(dl) = 0.
Proposition 2 (Statement 1) reveals that the presence of strategic customers aggravates the
rm's nancial distress signicantly. Specically, the threat of nancial distress, as measured by
the threshold TD(), becomes greater as the rm faces more strategic customers. In fact, when
the rm needs to deviate from the newsvendor benchmark (v; qNV ), i.e.  = TD(), the minimal
prot made by the rm is vdl  cqNV , strictly greater than TD(). This is because for (v; qNV ) to
be optimal, the rm needs to ensure that its probability of bankruptcy under the (hypothetical)
wait-equilibrium is zero. Otherwise, according to Proposition 1, the wait-equilibrium exists and
becomes the more appealing one for strategic customers. In this sense, the existence of strategic
customer behavior induces the rm to adopt a more conservative operational strategy.
As the level of nancial distress () increases beyond TD() (Statement 2), we observe two fea-
tures of the solution. First, when  is relatively low, it is always optimal for the rm to induce
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strategic customers to purchase early as the cost of doing so is low. In particular, note that the rela-
tionship between p and q corresponds to the downward-sloping segment of the buy{wait boundary
identied in Figure 3. This suggests that when  is relatively low, the rm eliminates strate-
gic waiting by lowering the probability of bankruptcy under the (hypothetical) wait-equilibrium
F (dW ).
Second, observe that when  > TD(), while the rm always lowers the inventory level, the
rm may only lower the price as nancial distress further deepens. This pecking order reects the
dierent roles played by inventory and price in mitigating distress: Lowering inventory alleviates
the adverse impact of nancial distress by both reducing the rm's procurement cost and inducing
strategic customers to purchase. Price discount, however, is a double-edged sword. On the one hand,
it reduces the strategic waiting motive and, hence, mitigates nancial distress indirectly. On the
other hand, lowering the price increases nancial distress directly due to lower margins. Therefore,
it is only employed when the cost of deterring strategic waiting through lowering inventory is high.
5.4. The rm's operational decisions under severe nancial distress (high )
As shown above, when  is low, the rm always nds it protable to induce customers to purchase.
However, as shown in the following proposition, this result no longer holds when the rm faces
severe nancial distress (high ).
Proposition 3. 9 Th and AB > 0 such that for   Th, the rm's optimal price p and inventory
q are:
1. for AB, (p; q) = (v; qWH ), where qWH is determined by:
qWH = (1 ) F 1

(c  b)  (s  b) F (qWH ) [1 qWH h(qWH )]
v  s

; (4)
2. for >AB, (p; q) = (pBH ; q
B
H), where p
B
H = v  (s  b)F (qBH) and qBH is determined by:
qBH = F
 1
0@ c  b
(v  b)  (s  b)
h
F (qBH)+h(q
B
H)
R qB
H
dl
F (x)dx
i
1A : (5)
The implications of Proposition 3, together with those of Proposition 2, are illustrated in Fig-
ure 4. In particular, the two statements in Proposition 2 are illustrated in Regions NV and BL,
respectively. When the rm is in deeper distress, the optimal strategy bifurcates depending on the
proportion of strategic customers: When a large share of customers are strategic (Region BH), the
rm continues to adjust its price and inventory to induce strategic customers to purchase early.
However, dierently from Region BL, the optimal price and inventory in this region correspond
to the horizontal segment of the buy{wait boundary in Figure 3, i.e. q =Qs(p). In other words,
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Figure 4 Illustration of the rm's optimal strategies.
BL
BH
NV
τ = TD(α)
α
τ
α = AB
Th
τ = TB(α)
ISC
Notes. NV represents the region where the newsvendor solution is optimal; BL represents inducing customers to buy
under low nancial distress by limiting the probability of bankruptcy under the (hypothetical) wait-equilibrium dW ;
BH represents inducing customers to buy under high nancial distress by limiting inventory q; and ISC represents
the strategy that ignores strategic consumers, i.e. (p; q)2
W .
the rm eliminates strategic waiting by directly limiting the leftover inventory available in the
liquidation sale.
On the other hand, with only a small proportion of strategic consumers (Region ISC in Figure 4),
it is actually optimal for the rm to not induce strategic customers to purchase early. The intuition
is as follows. For suciently large  , the rm's prot function is depicted in (2), where BH(p
B
H ; q
B
H)
is independent of . This is in contrast to the situation with low  (Proposition 2), where the cost
of inducing customers to purchase is lower when  is small. Because of this dierence, as nancial
distress deepens, the relative cost to induce strategic customers to purchase is high when  is low.
Therefore, the rm is indeed better o letting the small share of strategic customers wait. The
contrast between the rm's pricing strategy in Regions BL and that in BH, as well as those in the
other two regions, highlights that the composition of customers faced by a distressed rm could
have not only a quantitative, but also qualitative, impact on the rm's operational decisions.
5.5. Numerical results
To complement the analytical results presented in the previous sections, we conduct comprehensive
numerical studies.9 Figure 5 oers a representative view of these results. As shown in Figure 5(a),
as  increases, the rm's inventory level gradually drops from the newsvendor level and eventually
remains at the low level specied in Proposition 3 for suciently large  . Furthermore, the optimal
inventory level also declines in the presence of a greater proportion of strategic customers.
9We refer the readers to Online Appendix E for other parameters we have used for robustness checks.
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Figure 5 The impact of level of nancial distress () and fraction of strategic customers () on optimal decisions
and performance
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Notes: D  Triangular(0;100;50), v = 1, c = 0:6, s = 0:5, b = 0:3. Dierent lines represent dierent fractions of
strategic customers (), as marked in the legend. Figure 5(a) (5(b)) represents the inventory (price) change in
percentage relative to the the newsvendor benchmark (v; qNV ). Figure 5(d) represents the strategic share of distress
cost, dened as the proportion of total distress cost caused by strategic consumers, i.e. (;) (;0)
(;) ( 1;0) , where (;)
is the rm's optimal prot under (;). In Figure 5(d), the strategic share of distress cost is not dened when  is
low as the total distress cost is zero.
In contrast to inventory, the pattern for the optimal price discount, as shown in Figure 5(b),
varies distinctly for dierent levels of , echoing Proposition 3. When = 0, there is no incentive for
the rm to lower the price. At the low  level, the rm starts to oer a price discount when moving
out of Region NV and increases the price discount as  increases. However, the optimal price goes
back to the full price in the high-distress region when there are few strategic consumers since it
becomes too costly to induce them to buy and to let the myopic customers freeride the discounts.
When there are more strategic customers in the market (high ) and the nancial distress is severe
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(high ), strategic customers should not be ignored: The rm still oers moderate price discounts
to push all strategic consumers to make purchases.
Combining the patterns exhibited in Figures 5(a) and 5(b), we note that in the presence of
nancial distress, rms may emphasize on dierent operational levers depending on their consumer
compositions (), which can be related to product characteristics. For example, related to the exist-
ing empirical research on strategic customer behavior, which has identied that a larger fraction of
customers is strategic when the product price is high (Li et al. 2014), our results imply that retailers
in a market where the average price of the products is low, and hence lower  (e.g., supermarkets),
should pre-dominantly apply the inventory lever. However, for sellers focusing on high-valued prod-
uct categories (e.g., electronics and automobiles), it is crucial to accompany inventory reduction
with price discounts.
As shown in Figure 5(c), the rm's probability of bankruptcy under optimal operational decisions
increases in  . However, under the same  , a greater share of strategic customers does not necessarily
lead to a higher probability of bankruptcy. In fact, for lower  , the rm's bankruptcy probability
decreases in . The reason lies exactly on the rm's operational response to strategic customer
behavior: When  is low, the rm's optimal strategy is to induce early purchase (Region BL in
Figure 4) by oering (p; q) that eliminate the wait-equilibrium. As  increases, i.e., more customers
may wait strategically, eliminating the wait-equilibrium requires the rm to reduce its inventory
and/or price more aggressively, actually reducing the probability of bankruptcy. However, as the
cost associated with such mitigation increases in both  and , for higher  , the rm gives up its
eorts to lower the bankruptcy probability, causing the probability to jump to 100%, as shown in
Figure 5(c).
Finally, Figure 5(d) illustrates the proportion of the total cost of nancial distress that is due
to the presence of strategic customers, which we call the strategic share of distress cost. As shown,
xing  , the strategic share of distress cost increases with . On the other hand, with the same
proportion of strategic customers, the strategic share of distress cost is highest when  is at a
medium level, when the self-fullling nature of customers' anticipation of bankruptcy has the
strongest eect.
6. Using Deferred Discounts to Induce Early Purchase
While both inventory reduction and price discounts alleviate the cost of nancial distress, neither
mitigates a fundamental challenge faced by the rm; that is, the wait-equilibrium is always more
appealing to strategic customers when both equilibria exist. This hurts not only the rm's prof-
itability but also social welfare as the customers' valuation of the products declines over time. Is
there a mechanism that nudges strategic customers to purchase early when the wait-equilibrium
exists? In this section, we argue that deferred discount acts as exactly such a mechanism.
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As the name suggests, deferred discounts benet customers not immediately but in a later period,
which is often specied by the rm. Many widely used marketing tools can be seen as a form of
deferred discount. For example, rebate allows customers to receive a partial refund some time after
purchase. Consumer electronics stores such as Ritz Camera and CompUSA are among the rms
that frequently oer rebates. Recently, a real estate developer in Qinhuangdao, China that was
facing nancial pressure oered a 40% price discount through a rebate that would be returned to
customers at a rate of 10% per year over four years (Wang 2014). Another form of deferred discount
is store credit that can only be applied to a future purchase or service. For example, AT&T oered
a $50 discount on the new iPhone 6 upgrade in the form of bill credit applied over three subsequent
billing cycles (Siegal 2014).
An important feature of deferred discounts is that their value is contingent on the rm's future
nancial status as deferred discounts are often not honored when the rm goes bankrupt due to the
presence of other claims owed to creditors with higher priority. For example, when the DVD drive
maker CenDyne led for bankruptcy in 2003, it stopped honoring rebates (Shim 2003). Similarly,
other forms of deferred discount, such as store credit, coupons, and gift cards, were not accepted
after Circuit City led for bankruptcy (McCraken 2009). As we show later, this contingency allows
deferred discounts to better align customers' interests with the rm's in the presence of nancial
distress.
To incorporate deferred discounts into the base model, we augment the rm's operational deci-
sions to include not only the price p and inventory q but also a deferred discount with face value
t > 0. Customers receive the value t if and only if they purchase in the rst period and the rm sur-
vives to the second period.10 The sequence of events is the same as under the base model (Figure 2).
In the rest of the section, we characterize customers' purchase behavior under (p; q; t). The impact
of deferred discounts on the rm's operational decisions and performance is studied in Section 7.
Under (p; q; t), customers decide whether to purchase in the rst period or wait until the second
period by comparing their expected payos in these two periods. Obviously, their expected payo
in waiting is exactly the same as in Section 4. However, if they decide to purchase in the rst
period, in addition to the immediate surplus v   p, they also obtain the deferred discount with
expected value t F (d ), where F (d ) is the rm's survival probability. Therefore, customers benet
more from early purchase when the rm's probability of bankruptcy is low. In this sense, deferred
discounts better align customers' interests with those of the seller. This alignment is absent in
immediate discount, under which customers benet from the rm's nancial failure. This intuition
10 To keep the model tractable, we assume that the redemption of the deferred discounts is guaranteed if the rm
survives at the end of the rst period. Our main insights should remain unchanged as long as the rm does not go
bankrupt with certainty in the future.
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is formalized in the following proposition. In preparation, similar to the denition of 
0 in Section
4, we conne our analysis to (p; q; t)2
dd0 := f(p; q; t)jp2 (v  (s  b); v] and q dl and t > 0g.
Proposition 4. Let Qdds (p; t) := F
 1

v p+t
s b+t

and Qdd;as (p; t) and Q
dd;b
s (p; t) satisfy:
(s  b)F  Qdd;as + tF cQdd;as + p

= v  p+ t; (6)
(s  b)F

cQdd;bs + 
(1 )p

+ tF

cQdd;bs + 
p

= v  p+ t: (7)
For any (p; q; t)2
dd0 ,
1. the buy-equilibrium exists if and only if qmin

Qs;

p c

or q 2


p c ;
pQdds  
c
i
;
2. the wait-equilibrium exists if and only if q 2

Qs;

(1 )p c

or q >
max


(1 )p c ;
(1 )pQdds  
c

;
3. the buy-equilibrium is more appealing to strategic customers when q = Qddb (p; t). The wait-
equilibrium is more appealing when q >Qddb (p; t), where Q
dd
b (p; t) follows:
Qddb (p; t) =
8><>:
Qdd;bs if   [(1 )p  c]Qdd;as ;
Qdd;as if  2 ([(1 )p  c]Qdd;as ; (p  c)Qdds ];
Qs if  > (p  c)Qdds :
(8)
Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 6. By comparing Figures 3 and 6, we note several similarities
between Propositions 1 and 4. Indeed, as t moves to zero, Qdds () and Qddb () in Proposition 4
degenerate to Qs() and Qb() in Proposition 1, respectively. In general, the buy-equilibrium exists
when the inventory level is relatively low, while the wait-equilibrium exists for a higher inventory
level. In addition, when  is not extremely high, both equilibria may co-exist for inventory at the
medium level.
Aside from the above similarities, Figure 6 also reveals two distinctions between Propositions 1
and 4 caused by the deferred discount t. First, note that under a given  , the range of q such that
a buy- (wait-)equilibrium exists may not be continuous. This is due to a jump in the value of the
deferred discount corresponding to a jump in the bankruptcy probability. Take the buy-equilibrium
for  2 [(p   c)Qs; (p   c)Qdds ] as an example. First, when q < Qs, the low inventory level alone
ensures the existence of the buy-equilibrium, as in Section 4. However, for q 2

Qs;

p c

, because
 < (p  c)q, the rm's survival probability is zero, deeming deferred discounts valueless. However,
the increase in q gives customers a better chance of getting a bargain in liquidation, nudging
customers to wait. As such, the buy-equilibrium no longer exists. Finally, when q increases beyond

p c , the rm's upside potential increases; the value of a deferred discount sees an immediate jump
from zero to t[1   F (dB )]. For this reason, the buy-equilibrium arises again. Similar situations
happen with the wait-equilibrium for the same reason.
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Figure 6 Strategic customers' behavior in equilibrium under p and deferred discount t.
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Notes. B (W ) represents that the buy-equilibrium (wait-equilibrium) exists in the region. The equilibrium that is
more appealing to strategic customers is in bold font and underlined. In the shaded area, both the buy- and wait-
equilibria exist and customers may prefer either depending on the specic magnitudes of multiple parameters. We
omit the details because q <Qddb (p; t) cannot be an optimal solution when the buy-equilibrium is more appealing to
customers at q=Qddb (p; t).
Second, and more importantly, by introducing deferred discounts t, the buy-equilibrium may
become the most appealing even if both equilibria co-exist in the region. Indeed, as shown in
Figure 6, while both equilibria co-exist over a wide region when qQddb (p; t), deferred discounts are
able to push the maximum inventory level under which the buy-equilibrium is more appealing to
Qddb (p; t). How is it that the buy-equilibrium can be more appealing than the wait-equilibrium under
deferred discount? The reason lies in the contingent nature of deferred discount. Specically, in the
presence of deferred discount, customers' surplus of purchasing is dierent under the buy- and wait-
equilibria: When a strategic customer anticipates that all other customers will purchase in the rst
period, the customer's own surplus of purchasing, v p+t F (dB ), is higher than when he anticipates
that no peers will purchase v  p+ t F (dW ), as dB < dW . By contrast, under immediate discount,
customers' surplus from purchasing, v  p, is the same under the buy- and wait-equilibrium, while
their surplus of waiting, (s  b)F (min(q; d )) is higher under the wait-equilibrium. In this sense,
under immediate discount, the rm and customers have conicting interests: Under bankruptcy,
the rm loses while customers always gain. This conict of interests is (partially) resolved by
introducing deferred discount, under which customers also benet from the rm's survival.
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7. When Are Deferred Discounts Most Valuable to the Firm?
Understanding that the contingency embedded in deferred discounts provides an additional incen-
tive for customers to purchase early, in this section, we examine how this eect translates into
higher prots for the rm. Specically, we focus on the following question: Under what conditions
is employing deferred discounts most valuable to the rm?
7.1. The rm's prot function with deferred discount
To answer the above question, we rst examine the rm's prot function under (p; q; t), which we
denote as dd(p; q; t). Note that with t= 0, dd(p; q; t) degenerates to (p; q), as studied in Section
5. We focus on the case where q=Qddb (p; q; t) and   (p  c)q.11
As deferred discounts do not add value to the rm in the above two scenarios, for brevity of
exposition, we focus on the scenario where q =Qddb (p; q; t) and   (p  c)q. Analyzing the rm's
payos depending on dierent demand realizations as in Section 5.1, we have:
dd(p; q; t) = BL (p; q)  t
Z q
dB
min(x; q)dF (x); (9)
where BL (p; q) follows (1) in Section 5. As deferred discounts are only redeemable when the rm
survives, i.e. the demand is no less than dB , the total cost of oering deferred discounts is t multi-
plied by the expected rst-period sales when the rm survives. The benet of deferred discount, on
the other hand, is that it is able to support higher p and q yet still induce customers to purchase
early by pushing the buy{wait boundary from q =Qb(p) in Figure 3 to q =Q
dd
b (p; t) in Figure 6.
Deferred discounts are valuable if and only if the benet outweighs the cost.
7.2. When deferred discounts can (or cannot) be valuable
While it is clear that the rm's prot will not be worse o by having t as an additional lever, the
next proposition oers some insight into the conditions under which oering deferred discounts can
strictly improve the rm's prot as well as when it cannot.
Proposition 5. Let (p; q) be the rm's optimal decision without deferred discounts and
(pdd;; qdd;; tdd;) be the rm's optimal decision with deferred discounts, i.e. (p; q) = argmax(p; q)
and (pdd;; qdd;; tdd;) = argmaxdd(p; q; t).
1. When any of the following three conditions holds, oering deferred discounts does not improve
the rm's prot, i.e. dd(pdd;; qdd;; tdd;) = (p; q)
(a)   TD();
(b) qdd; >Qddb (p
dd;; tdd;);
11As shown later in Proposition 5, those (p; q; t) that do not satisfy these conditions will be either only as good as
without deferred discounts (t= 0) or dominated by other decisions.
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(c) (pdd;  c)Qdds (pdd;)>  .
2. When p < v and the rm's probability of bankruptcy is suciently small under (p; q), oer-
ing deferred discounts strictly improve the rm's prot, i.e. dd(pdd;; qdd;; tdd;)>(p; q).
Statement 1 in Proposition 5 identies several conditions under which deferred discounts are
not valuable. As a mechanism that induces customers to purchase, oering deferred discounts is
clearly not benecial in the absence of nancial distress, i.e.   TD(), or when it cannot induce
customers to purchase, i.e. qdd; > Qddb (p
dd;; tdd;). Finally, when the level of nancial distress is
high, i.e.  > (pdd;  c)Qdds (pdd;), the probability of redeeming a deferred discount is zero, also
rendering deferred discounts valueless. The above three conditions correspond to Region NV and,
roughly, Regions ISC and BH in Figure 4, respectively.
Statement 2 in Proposition 5 shows that in the part of Region BL that neighbors Region NV,
oering deferred discounts is strictly benecial to the rm. The intuition behind this result is as
follows. The boundary of Region NV, TD(), is determined so that the rm will not go bankrupt
even if all customers wait, i.e. F (dW ) = 0. This is exactly because, according to Proposition 1, in
order to induce customers to purchase, we need to eliminate the wait-equilibrium. For the same
reason, according to Proposition 2, as  increases slightly beyond TD() (and when f(dl) > 0),
the rm needs to lower its price and inventory immediately, even though the rm's lowest possible
prot pdl cQb(p) is still greater than TD(). In this region, by employing a small deferred discount
t v p, the rm is able to stock atQddb (v; t) as characterized in Proposition 4 while still eliminating
strategic waiting. Such an increase in inventory level directly translates to an increase in the rm's
prot.
7.3. The impact of deferred discounts on operational decisions and performance
To complement Proposition 5, we conduct numerical experiments using the same parameters as in
Section 5.5. A representative set of results is illustrated in Figure 7. Specically, Figure 7(a) shows
that deferred discounts are employed when the rm's nancial distress is at a medium level. This
region corresponds to the low  region in Figure 6, where both the buy- and wait-equilibria exist
and deferred discounts are able to push the buy{wait boundary upward. When  is extremely high,
the two equilibria do not co-exist, rendering deferred discounts valueless. Both phenomenon echo
Proposition 5. In addition, the rm oers a larger deferred discount when it faces a greater share of
strategic customers. This result is again consistent with the role deferred discounts play in better
aligning the interests of the rm and its customers. Due to this eect, the optimal inventory level
with deferred discounts is greater than that without (Figure 7(b)). Such changes in operational
decisions also lead to performance improvement. As shown in Figures 7(c) and 7(d), employing
deferred discounts reduces both the rm's probability of bankruptcy and the strategic share of
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Figure 7 The usage of deferred discounts and its impact on the rm's operational decisions and performance
under (; )
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Notes. D  Triangular(0;100;50),v = 1, c = 0:6, s = 0:5, b = 0:3. Dierent lines represent dierent , with the
corresponding numbers in the legend. In Figure 7(a), the optimal amount of deferred discount is plotted as a fraction
of v. Figures 7(b), 7(c), and 7(d) plot the percentage dierences between the corresponding quantities under the
optimal decisions with deferred discount (pdd;; qdd;; tdd;), and those without (p; q). As such, a positive (negative)
number suggests the inventory with deferred discounts is higher (lower) than that without.
distress cost. Indeed, our numerical results suggest that deferred discounts can strictly improve the
rm's prots over the entire Region BL depicted in Figure 4 and also in the parts of Region ISC
and Region BH that neighbor Region BL.
In summary, by better aligning the interests of the rm and its customers in the presence of
nancial distress, deferred discounts enrich the rm's toolbox for ghting nancial diculties caused
by customers' strategic behavior. In addition, we nd that deferred discounts are most valuable
to the rm when it faces a medium level of nancial distress and many strategic customers. This
is consistent with anecdotal evidence that rebates have been frequently employed by consumer
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electronics stores facing nancial pressure, such as CompUSA and Ritz Camera.
8. Conclusion
Financial diculties and strategic customers pose major challenges for rms in terms of operational
strategies and nancial performance. This paper focuses on the interaction between these two
challenges. Specically, we nd that customers' strategic behavior when anticipating a liquidation
sale can play an important role in determining a rm's bankruptcy risk.
The dynamics linking customers' strategic behavior and the rm's probability of bankruptcy have
important implications for common operational levers such as inventory and price. In particular,
we nd that as a rm's nancial situation worsens, aggressive price discounting may not be the
most eective strategy to induce customers to purchase early. Instead, the rm should rst lower
inventory and then reduce both price and inventory. As the level of nancial distress increases
further, it may be optimal for the rm to cut back its price discount when there is only a small
proportion of strategic customers. In addition to inventory and price discounting, we argue that
deferred discounts, such as rebates and store credit, are an eective mechanism for mitigating a
rm's nancial distress. Deferred discounts create value by better aligning customers' interests with
those of the rm. As such, deferred discounts are most valuable to a rm when its level of nancial
distress is not too high and a large proportion of its customers are strategic.
On the nancial side, the paper points out that while a rm's value always decreases as it becomes
more nancially distressed or faces a larger share of strategic customers, facing a large proportion
of strategic consumers may actually lower a rm's probability of bankruptcy as it adopts a more
conservative operational strategy, alluding to that rms with dierent consumer characteristics
may adopt dierent capital structures.
As an initial attempt to link customer behavior explicitly to the cost of nancial distress and the
corresponding operational decisions, this work can be extended in several directions. First, focusing
on operational implications, we treat the rm's nancing decisions as exogenous. Extending the
model to endogenous nancing decisions represents a possible extension. In addition, our model
leads to several predictions about the relationships among the fraction of strategic customers, level
of nancial distress, and operational metrics, some of which may serve as testable hypotheses for
future empirical research by combining methods used to identify strategic customers and nancial
distress.
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Appendix A: List of Notation
Table 2 summarizes the paper's notation. In general, superscript B (W ) represents the quantity under the
buy- (wait-)equilibrium, while superscript dd represents the quantity with deferred discount.
Appendix B: Proofs
B.1. Proofs of results in Section 4.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider the following two scenarios.
1. When the rm does not go bankrupt, it enters the salvage sale. Facing an innite number of bargain
hunters with valuation s, the rm should set p2 = s.
2. When the rm goes bankrupt, it enters the liquidation sale and faces bargain hunters with valuation
b and waiting strategic customers with valuation s. Obviously, when the inventory available for liquidation
is less than the number of waiting strategic customers or, equivalently, if the total inventory q is less than
the realized demand D in the rst period, the rm can liquidate all inventory at price s. Otherwise, the rm
needs to set p2 = b to sell part of the inventory to the bargain hunters. 
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove the three statements in sequence.
Statement 1: The existence condition for the buy-equilibrium. By denition, the sucient and
necessary conditions for a buy-equilibrium to exist are that under the belief that all other customers buy
in the rst period, a strategic customer does not have the incentive to deviate from buying to waiting.
Mathematically, this is equivalent to
v  p (s  b)F  min(dB ; q) : (10)
Consider two cases.
1. When dB < q (q >

p c ), equation (10) is equivalent to F (d
B
 ) v ps b . This condition always holds when
dB  dl; that is, q pdl c . When dB  dl, F (dB ) v ps b is equivalent to q pQs c . Combining the two cases,
as Qs  dl, the buy-equilibrium exists if q 2


p c ;
pQs 
c
i
.
2. When dB  q (q  p c ), equation (10) is equivalent to q  Qs. Combining the two scenarios, a buy-
equilibrium exists if and only if qmin


p c ;Qs

or q 2


p c ;
pQs 
c
i
.
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Table 2 Notation
 the rm's net nancial obligation. The rm goes bankrupt when the rst-
period prot is less than 
 the proportion of rst-period customers that are strategic, 2 [0;1]
D the random number of rst-period customers, D 2 [dl; dh), D 2 F ()
v the rst-period valuation of myopic and strategic customers
c the rm's unit procurement cost
s the second-period valuation of strategic customers and bargain hunters in
salvage sale
b the second-period valuation of bargain hunters in salvage sale
p the rst-period price set by the rm
q the rst-period inventory set by the rm
p2 the second-period price set by the rm
dj j =B;W , the minimum rst-period demand realization to avoid bankruptcy
when strategic customers buy (wait) in the rst period.

0 
0 := f(p; q)jp2 (v  (s  b); v] and q dlg
Qs(p) Qs = F
 1

v p
s b

.
Qb(p) the buy-wait boundary, Qb =max

Qs;
(1 )pQs 
c


B the buy-region 
B = f(p; q)2
0 j qQb(p)g

W the wait-region 
W = f(p; q)2
0 j q >Qb(p)g
(p; q) the rm's total prot under price p and inventory q
qNV qNV = F 1

c s
v s

qNVb q
NV
b = F
 1

c b
v b

TD() TD() = (1 )vdl  cqNV
t the amount of deferred discount, t 0.

dd0 

dd
0 := f(p; q; t) j p2 (v  (s  b); v]; q dl; and t > 0g
Qdds (p; t) the buy-wait boundary under (p; t) for high  , Q
dd
s (p; t) = F
 1

v p+t
s b+t

.
Qdd;as (p; t) the buy-wait boundary under (p; t) for low  , (s   b)F (Qdd;as ) +
tF

cQ
dd;a
s +
p

= v  p+ t:
Qdd;bs (p; t) the buy-wait boundary under (p; t) for medium  , (s   b)F
h
cQ
dd;b
s +
(1 )p
i
+
tF

cQ
dd;b
s +
p

= v  p+ t:
dd(p; q; t) the rm's total prot under p, q, and deferred discount t
Noticing that 
p c <
pQs 
c
if and only if Qs >

p c , we can further simplify the above range by discussing
two scenarios. First, when  > (p  c)Qs, we have p c >Qs, that is, min


p c ;Qs

=Qs. Also,

p c >
pQs 
c
,
that is,


p c ;
pQs 
c
i
= ;. Combining the two parts, when  > (p  c)Qs, the buy-equilibrium exists if and
only if qQs.
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Similarly, when   (p   c)Qs, we have min


p c ;Qs

= 
p c . We also have

p c  pQs c , that is,

p c ;
pQs 
c
i
6= ;. Combining the two parts, when   (p  c)Qs, the buy-equilibrium exists if and only if
q pQs 
c
.
Note that Qs >
pQs 
c
if and only if  > (p c)Qs. Therefore, combining the two scenarios, i.e.  > (p c)Qs
and   (p  c)Qs, the buy-equilibrium exists if and only if qmax
 
Qs;
pQs 
c

, as desired.
Statement 2: The existence condition for the wait-equilibrium. Symmetrically, the wait-equilibrium
exists if and only if a customer's expected surplus of waiting is larger than the surplus of buying in the rst
period, assuming all customers wait. That is,
v  p < (s  b)F (min(dW ; q)): (11)
Again, consider two scenarios.
1. When dW < q, (11) is equivalent to q >
(1 )pQs 
c
. Combining the condition dW < q, that is, q >

(1 )p c , the wait-equilibrium exists if q >max
h

(1 )p c ;
(1 )pQs 
c
i
.
2. When dW  q, that is, q  (1 )p c , (11) is simplied to v   p < (s   b)F (q), that is, q > Qs. The
condition for the existence of the wait-equilibrium is q 2

Qs;

(1 )p c
i
.
Note that when  < [(1  )p   c]Qs, we have

Qs;

(1 )p c
i
= ;. Furthermore, (1 )pQs 
c
> 
(1 )p c .
Therefore, the wait-equilibrium exists if and only if q > (1 )pQs 
c
:
Similarly, when   [(1  )p  c]Qs, we have

Qs;

(1 )p c
i
6= ;, and (1 )pQs 
c
 
(1 )p c . Therefore,
the wait-equilibrium exists if and only if q >Qs:
Note that Qs  (1 )pQs c if and only if   [(1 )p  c]Qs. Therefore, the above two conditions can be
combined, and hence, the wait-equilibrium exists if and only if q >max

Qs;
(1 )pQs 
c

, as desired.
Statement 3: Comparing the two equilibria. Note that customers prefer the wait-equilibrium to the
buy-equilibrium if and only if their expected surplus under the wait-equilibrium is higher, that is, v  p <
(s  b)F (min(q; dW )) ; which is exactly the condition for the wait-equilibrium to exist. Therefore, customers
prefer the wait-equilibrium to the buy-equilibrium as long as the wait-equilibrium exists. 
B.2. Proofs of results in Section 5.
Proof of Lemma 2. Using Lemma C.2, we can write out the rm's prot function with = 0 for (p; q)2

0 as follows:
(p; q) = (p  c)q  (p  s)
Z q
dl
(q x)dF (x)  (s  b)
Z min(dB ;q)
dl
(q x)dF (x): (12)
It is easy to see that (p; q) increases in p, and hence, p = v, allowing us to rewrite the above equation as:
(v; q) = (v  c)q  (v  s)
Z q
dl
(q x)dF (x)  (s  b)
Z min(dB ;q)
dl
(q x)dF (x): (13)
Next, we solve (v; q) for the optimal inventory q. Note that the rst statement in Lemma 2 (p = v, q = qNV
for   vdl  cqNV ) is a special case of the rst statement in Proposition 2. See the corresponding proof for
details. For  > vdl   cqNV , depending on the relative magnitude of q, dl, and dB , we discuss the following
three scenarios.
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1. When q > dl  dB , i.e. q 2
 
dl;
vdl 
c

, the optimal solution is the boundary one, i.e. q= vdl 
c
.
2. When q > dB >dl, i.e. q >max

vdl 
c
; 
v c

. The rm's prot function can be simplied to:
0L(v; q) = (v  c)q  (v  s)
Z q
dl
(q x)dF (x)  (s  b)
Z dB
dl
(q x)dF (x): (14)
Similar to the proof in Lemma C.3, we 0L is pseudo-concave for  < (v  c)q. Therefore, the optimal solution
is either the boundary one, i.e. max

vdl 
c
; 
v c

, or the unique interior solution that satises
d0L
dq
= 0. Let
the interior solution be q0L, where
q0L =
F 1

c  b
v  s

 

s  b
v  s

F

cq0L+ 
v

1 

c[(v  c)q0L   ]
v2

h

cq0L+ 
v

: (15)
3. When dB  q > dl or, equivalently, q 2

vdl 
c
; 
v c
i
, the rm's prot function can be simplied to:
0H(v; q) = (v  c)q  (v  b)
Z q
dl
(q x)dF (x): (16)
It is easy to check that 0H is concave, and hence, the optimal solution is either the interior optima q
NV
b or
the boundary solution 
v c . However, note that as
d0H
dq
  d0L
dq
< 0, and hence, 
v c cannot be optimal.
Summarizing the above three scenarios, there are three candidates q for the global optima: vdl 
c
, q0L, and
qNVb . To compare the three solutions, we consider the following two cases depending on the magnitude of  .
1. When  2 ((vdl  cqNV ); (v  c)dl], only vdl c and q0L are relevant. Dene T 0 2 [vdl  cqNV ; (v  c)dl] as:
(v  s) F

vdl T 0
c

  (s  b)

(v  c)dl T 0
v

h(dl) = c  s: (17)
We can verify that when   T 0, q0L  vdl c , and hence vdl c is optimal; otherwise, q0L is optimal.
2. When  > (v   c)dl, only q0L and qNVb are relevant. To compare the two, it is easy to see that when
dWH
dq
jq= 
v c > 0, q
0
L is optimal; otherwise q
NV
b is optimal. Note that
dWH
dq
jq= 
v c > 0 is equivalent to  >
(v  c)qNVb .
Combining the two cases, the optimal q can be characterized as:
q =
8>>><>>>:
qNV for   vdl  cqNV ;
vdl 
c
for   (vdl  cqNV ; T0) ;
q0L for   (T0; (v  c)qNVb ) ;
qNVb for  > (v  c)qNVb :
(18)
The monotonicity of q follows directly by comparing the four quantities over the relevant range of  . 
Proof of Proposition 2. We prove this proposition in four steps.
Step 1: (v; qNV ) is optimal if and only if   TD(). To see this, it is obvious that (v; qNV ) is optimal
for   TD(). To show that (v; qNV ) is not optimal for  > TNV (), note that for  > TNV (), strategic
customers prefer to wait under (v; qNV ). Therefore, the relevant prot function at (v; qNV ) is either WL or
WH , as in Lemma C.2. Assume 
W
L is the relevant prot function. It is easy to check that
dWL
dq
jq=qNV < 0.
Furthermore, for  2

0; qNV   (1 )vdl 
c

, (v; qNV   ) 2 
W . As WL (v; q) is continuously dierentiable at
q= qNV , 9 2

0; qNV   (1 )vdl 
c

such that (v; qNV   )>(v; qNV ). Hence, (v; qNV ) cannot be optimal.
Similarly, we can also show that (v; qNV ) cannot be optimal when WH is the relevant prot function.
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Step 2: q < qNV for   TD(). To see this, note that according to Lemma C.3, if (p; q) 2 
W , then
q < (1 )qNV . Similarly, if (p; q) 2
B, we can show that for any p  v, at q  qNV , dWL
dq jq=q < 0, so
q < qNV .
Step 3: The existence of TB(). First, according to Corollary C.1, for   (1 )(vdl  cqNV ), only the
buy-region solution can be optimal; second, according to Lemma C.5, for   TB;1(), the optimal buy-region
solution satises qB; = (1 )p
Qs(pB;) 
c
. Therefore, 9 TB()>min((1 )(vdl  cqNV ); TB;1()) such that
q = (1 )p
Qs(p) 
c
.
Step 4: The optimal p for   TD() + . Following the last step, we know that for suciently small
, the optimal solution (p; q) satises q = (1 )p
Qs(p) 
c
. Therefore, to prove Statement 2(b), we only
need to show that for suciently small , the resulting dW under (p
; q) satises dW = dl for f(dl)> 0, and
dW >dl for f(dl) = 0.
To show this, in preparation, dene function BL (y) = 
B
L (p(y); q(y)), with p(y) = v (s b)F (y) and q(y) =
(1 )p(y)y 
c
. Under this denition, y can be seen as the wait-equilibrium default threshold dW under (p; q).
Let y = argmax BL (y). Clearly, we have y
  dl. Note that at y= dl, we have p(y) = v, dp(y)dy = (s  b)f(dl),
q(y) = (1 )vdl 
c
, and dq(y)
dy
=
 
1 
c

[v  (s  b)dlf(dl)] : Finally, dB = cq(y)+p(y) = (1   )y < dl. Taking the
derivative of BL with respect to y at y= dl, we have:
d^BL
dy
=
(1 )v
c
[(v  c)  (v  s)F (q)]  (s  b)f(dl)

(1 )dl
c
[(v  c)  (v  s)F (q)]+
Z q
dl
F (x)dx

: (19)
Clearly, for f(dl) = 0,
d^BL
dy
jx=dl> 0, therefore y >dl or, equivalently, p < v.
On the other hand, for f(dl)> 0, for suciently small , q qNV , and hence, d^
B
L
dx
jx=dl< 0, i.e. p = v is a
local optima. Now consider y > dl, taking the derivative of 
B
L with respect to y:
dBL
dy
= [(p  c)  (p  s)F (q)] dq
dy
+
Z q
dl
F (x)dx

dp
dy
: (20)
Assume that the global optima y > dl, i.e. p < v. According to Lemma C.5, we must have
dq(y)
dy > 0. In
addition, for y > dl to be the global optima, we must also have
dBl
dy
= 0. As dq(y
)
dy > 0 and
dp(y)
dy < 0,
dBl
dy
= 0 only if (p  c)  (p  s)F (q(y))> 0, i.e. q(y)< F

p c
p s

. As p < v, we have q(y)< qNV . On the
other hand, for suciently small , q(dl) =
(1 )vdl 
c
is arbitrarily close to qNV , and hence, q(y)< q(dl).
As p(y)< v= p(dl), the prot under (v; q(dl)) is greater than (p(y); q(y)) contradicts the assumption that
y >dl is the global optima. Therefore,

v; (1 )vdl 
c

is optimal for  < TD()+ . 
Proof of Proposition 3. According to Lemma C.6, for suciently large  , (pBH ; q
B
H) is the optimal buy-
region solution. Similarly, according to Corollary C.2, (v; qWH ) is the only possible solution in the wait-region
that can be globally optimal. Therefore, 9 Th such that for  > Th, (p; q) = (pBH ; qBH) or (v; qWH ).
Next, note that WH (v; q
W
H ) decreases while 
W
H (p
B
H ; q
B
H) remains constant. In addition, as q
B
H < q
NV
b , (v; q
W
H )
dominates (pBH ; q
B
H) at  = 0. On the other hand, when  is suciently high, according to Corollary C.1,
(v; qWH ) is dominated by (p
B
H ; q
B
H). Therefore, there exists a A
B > 0 such that BH(p
B
H ; q
B
H) = 
W
H (v; q
W
h ) at
=AB, and BH(p
B
H ; q
B
H)>
W
H (v; q
W
h ) if and only if >A
B. 
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B.3. Proofs of results in Section 6.
Proof of Proposition 4. We prove the three statements separately.
Statement 1: The sucient and necessary conditions for the buy-equilibrium to exist. The buy-
equilibrium exists if and only if, assuming all other strategic customers purchase early, the expected surplus
for one customer from buying in the rst period is greater than the surplus of waiting. We consider two
scenarios.
1. When (p  c)q >  or, equivalently, dB > q, the rm's survival probability is zero, and hence deferred
discount has no value to customers. Therefore, the buy-equilibrium exists if and only if v  p (s  b)F (q)
or, equivalently, qQs.
2. When (p c)q  , that is, dB  q, the rm survives with probability F (dB ). The buy-equilibrium exists
if and only if v  p+ t[1 F (dB )] (s  b)F (dB ) or, equivalently, q pQ
dd
s  
c
.
To summarize the above two scenarios, the buy-equilibrium exists if and only if q 2


p c ;
pQdds  
c
i
or q 
min

Qs;

p c

.
Statement 2: The sucient and necessary conditions for the wait-equilibrium to exist. The
wait-equilibrium exists if and only if, assuming all other strategic customers wait, the expected surplus for
one customer from waiting is larger than the surplus of buying in the rst period. We again consider two
scenarios.
1. When  > [(1 )p c]q, that is, q < dW . In this case, the rm's survival probability is zero and deferred
discount therefore has no value. Thus, the wait-equilibrium exists if and only if v   p < (s   b)F (q), i.e.
q >Qs.
2. When   [(1  )p  c]q, we have q  dW . The rm's survival probability is F (dW ). Thus, the wait-
equilibrium exists if and only if v  p+ t < (s  b+ t)F (dW ), i.e. q > (1 )pQ
dd
s  
c
.
Summarizing the above two scenarios, the wait-equilibrium exists if and only if q 2

Qs;

(1 )p c

or q >
max


(1 )p c ;
(1 )pQdds  
c

.
Statement 3: The region in which the buy-equilibrium is more appealing. According to Lemma
C.11, we know that when q=Qddb , the buy-equilibrium is more appealing to strategic customers.
In addition, the statement that strategic customers prefer the wait-equilibrium when q >Qddb follows from
the proof of Lemma C.11. Specically, consider two scenarios.
1. When   (p   c)Qdds , according to the proof of Lemma C.11, both equilibria exist when q 2
Qddb ;
pQdds  
c
i
, and customers prefer to wait. When q >
pQdds  
c
, only the wait-equilibrium exists. Therefore,
customers wait when q >Qddb .
2. When  > (p  c)Qdds , as shown, the two equilibria are mutually exclusive, and hence, customers wait
when q >Qddb . 
B.4. Proofs of results in Section 7.
Proof of Proposition 5. For Statement 1, we consider the three conditions separately.
1. If   TD(), it is obvious that (v; qNV ) is optimal.
2. If q >Qddb (p; t), strategic customers wait and the corresponding prot function is:
dd(p; q; t) = W (p; q)  t
Z q
1 
dW
min((1 )x; q)dF (x)<W (p; q) (21)
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3. If (p  c)Qdds (p)<  , without loss of generality, assume qQddb (p; t), strategic customers purchase early,
and the corresponding prot function dd(p; q; t) = BH(p; q).
For Statement 2, we consider the case where the bankruptcy risk under (p; q) is zero. It is clear that
when p < v and the corresponding dB  dl, i.e. pdl   cq   , the corresponding prot function without
deferred discount is BL (). Following (9), 
dd(v; q; v p) = BL (p; q). In addition, note that Qddb (v; v p)>
Qb(p
) for pdl  cq   . Therefore, there exists q0 > q such that under (v; q0; v  p) we have dB  dl, and
q0 Qddb (v; v  p). Therefore, dd(v; q0; v  p)>dd(v; q; v  p) = BL (p; q). Due to continuity, the result
continues to hold when the bankruptcy risk is suciently small, as desired. 
Appendix C: Supplemental Results
This appendix includes supplemental materials and technical lemmas that support the proofs of the analytical
results presented in the paper. The proofs of these results are in Online Appendix D.
C.1. Supplemental results for Section 4.
Lemma C.1. Assume the rm chooses the second-period price p2 to maximize revenue.
1. If strategic customers purchase in the rst period, the distribution of p2 is the same as in Lemma 1.
2. If strategic customers wait,
p2 =
(
b for D<min

cq+
(1 )p ;

b
s+(1 )b

q

;
s otherwise:
(22)
Remark: By comparing the above result with Lemma 1), we can see that the distribution of the second-
period price p2 follows a similar structure under the two objectives (inventory clearance and revenue maxi-
mization): The rm sets p2 = b if and only if the realized demand is lower than the minimum of the bankruptcy
threshold d and (an increasing function of) inventory level q. Note that d increases in  , the rm's level of
nancial distress. This suggests that the second-period price p2 is more likely to be b as  increases (the rm
becomes more nancially distressed). This is exactly the force that drives our results on customer behavior
and optimal decisions. For example, this result directly causes the piecewise linear pattern of the buy{wait
boundary in Figure 3: When  is small, d is smaller than (the function of) q, and the probability that p2 = b
is determined by  , as is the customers' waiting incentive. Therefore, the Qb(p) decreases in  . However, as
 becomes larger, the probability that p2 = b depends only on q, as does the customers' waiting incentive,
leading to Qb(p) independent of  . Therefore, we would expect the qualitative insights in this paper to remain
unchanged if the rm maximizes its revenue in the second period.
That said, we can also observe that the probability that p2 = b is lower under the revenue-maximization
objective than the inventory-clearance objective. As a result, customers actually have less incentive to wait,
rendering strategic waiting less harmful for the rm. Therefore, we would expect the eects identied in
our results to be smaller under the revenue-maximization objective than that under the inventory-clearance
objective.
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C.2. Supplemental results for Section 5.
Lemma C.2. The rm's total expected prot under (p; q)2
0 (p; q) is:
(p; q) =
8>>><>>>:
BL (p; q) for (p; q)2
B and (p  c)q 
BH(p; q) for (p; q)2
B and (p  c)q < 
WL (p; q) for (p; q)2
W and [(1 )p  c]q 
WH (p; q) for (p; q)2
W and [(1 )p  c]q < ;
(23)
where BL (p; q) and 
B
H(p; q) are dened in (1) and (2), respectively, in the main body of the paper and
WL (p; q) = (p  c)q  (p  s)
Z q
1 
dl
[q  (1 )x]dF (x)  (s  b)
Z dW
dl
[q  (1 )x]dF (x); (24)
WH (p; q) = (p  c)q  (p  s)
Z q
1 
dl
[q  (1 )x]dF (x)  (s  b)
Z q
dl
[q  (1 )x]dF (x): (25)
Remark: The above lemma summarizes the rm's prot function according to dierent regions for (p; q).
In addition, note that (3) is a combination of (24) and (25).
Lemma C.3. Let (pW;; qW;) be the optimal price and inventory in the wait-region, i.e. (pW;; qW;) =
argmax(p;q)2
W (p; q). For  > T
D(), (pW;; qW;) = argmax(p;q)2
0 (p; q) only if:
1. pW; = v, and
2. qW; = qWL or q
W
H , where q
W
H is dened in (4) in Proposition 3, and
qWL = (1 ) F 1

c  b
v  s

 

s  b
v  s

F

cqWL + 
(1 )v

1 

c[(v  c)qWL    ]
(1 )v2

h

cqWL + 
(1 )v

: (26)
Remark: The above lemma identies the necessary conditions for a solution (p; q) in the wait-region to be
the global optimal one. As we are only interested in the global optima, we need only focus on the solutions
above.
Corollary C.1. (p; q) 62
W for   (1 )(vdl  cqNV ) or  1  dlqNV .
Remark: These conditions show that the rm is better o inducing customers to purchase when  is small
or  is large.
Corollary C.2. 9 TW () such that (v; qWH ) (v; qWL ) if and only if   TW ().
Remark: This result shows that when  is suciently high, (v; qWH ) is the only possible wait-region solution
that is globally optimal.
Lemma C.4. Let ^BH(q) := 
B
H(v  (s  b)F (q); q). ^BH(q) is pseudo-concave in q.
Lemma C.5. Let (pB;; qB;) be the optimal price and inventory in the buy-region, i.e. (pB;; qB;) =
argmax(p;q)2
B (p; q). (p
B;; qB;) satisfy qB; =Qb(pB) and
dQb(p
B;)
dpB; < 0 if p
B; < v.
Lemma C.6. For  > TD(), 9 TB;1() and TB;2() where TB;2() TB1()>TD() such that
1. for   TB;1(), qB; = (1 )pB;Qs(pB;) 
c
;
2. for  2 (TB;1(); TB;2(), qB; =Qs(pB;) and (pB;  c)qB;)<  ;
3. for  > TB;2(), qB; = qBH as in (5) and p
B; = v  (s  b)F (qBH).
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Remark: This lemma has two implications: First, it shows that for low  ( < TB;1()), the optimal solution
induces customers to purchase early by constraining the probability of bankruptcy under the hypothetical
wait-equilibrium F (dW ); for high  , it induces early purchase by directly limiting the inventory level. Second,
it gives the exact optimal solution in the buy-region for suciently high  .
C.3. Technical results for Section 6.
Lemma C.7. The following three statements are equivalent.
1. Qdd;as Qdds ;
2.   (p  c)Qdds ;
3.   (p  c)Qdd;as .
Lemma C.8. Qdd;bs 2

(1 )pQdds  
c
;
pQdds  
c

.
Lemma C.9. The following three statements are equivalent.
1. Qdd;as Qdd;bs ;
2.   [(1 )p  c]Qdd;as ;
3.   [(1 )p  c]Qdd;bs .
Lemma C.10. With deferred discount t, when multiple equilibria exist,
1. for q < dB , the wait-equilibrium is more appealing to strategic customers;
2. for q 2 [dB ; dW ), the buy-equilibrium is more appealing to strategic customers if and only if qQdd;as ;
3. for q > dW , the buy-equilibrium is more appealing to strategic customers if and only if qQdd;bs .
Lemma C.11. When both the buy- and wait-equilibria exist, the buy-equilibrium is more appealing to
strategic customers if one of the following two sets of conditions holds:
1.   [(1 )p  c]Qdd;as and qQdd;bs ;
2.  2 ([(1 )p  c]Qdd;as ; (p  c)Qdds ] and qQdd;as .
